a commonplace book
[P]lay demands acceptance, not belief: I didn’t have to suspend my disbelief to accept the truth of Fairyland any more than athletes have to suspend their disbelief when they accept that a bunch of chalk lines drawn on the ground place certain restrictions on their movements.
David Egan, “Children and Animals,” The Point
An interesting distinction between acceptance and belief. But I suppose “belief” is one of those things that must be defined by an author. Compare Charles Sanders Pierce’s definition vs. John Dewey’s–and David Egan’s. They probably don’t line up exactly. It seems that Egan defines belief in terms of its relation to more axiomatic fact than fact in general(?). For instance, Mike Rugnetta’s definition of belief in his discussion of Internet conspiracism would seem to encompass acceptance into belief insofar as there are facts that are non-axiomatic (such as the convention of chalk lines in sports).